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PRELIMINARY RULINGS AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 
 
Anthony Arnull* 
 
Introduction 
 
The central role played by the preliminary rulings procedure in the 
development and functioning of the Union legal order is undisputed. In a 
report on the application of the Treaty on European Union issued in the 
run-up to the 1996 IGC,1 the Court of Justice described it as 
 
the veritable cornerstone of the operation of the internal market, since 
it plays a fundamental role in ensuring that the law established by the 
Treaties retains its Community character with a view to guaranteeing 
that the law has the same effect in all circumstances in all the 
Member States of the European Union. 
 
In Opinion 2/13,2 the Court stated that the judicial system of the Union 
 
has as its keystone the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in 
Article 267 TFEU, which, by setting up a dialogue between one court 
and another, specifically between the Court of Justice and the courts 
and tribunals of the Member States, has the object of securing 
uniform interpretation of EU law…, thereby serving to ensure its 
consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, the 
particular nature of the law established by the Treaties…’3 
 
                                                          
*Barber Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Birmingham, UK. I am grateful to my 
colleague, Sophie Boyron, for discussing with me the approach of the French courts. 
 
1 ‘The Proceedings of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities’, 22–26 May 1995 (No. 15/95) para 11. 
2 EU:C:2014:2454. 
3 Opinion, para 176. 
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The procedure has acquired this exalted status by happenstance rather 
than design. The idea of incorporating in the Treaty framework a system of 
preliminary rulings originated in a suggestion by Maurice Lagrange, the 
principal architect of the Court and later an Advocate General at the Court 
from 1958-64, during the discussions which led to the ECSC Treaty. He 
envisaged what became Article 41 ECSC as an addendum to a provision – 
later Article 40 ECSC - giving national courts and tribunals a limited 
jurisdiction over disputes involving the Community and persons other than 
its servants. The principle underlying the suggestion was that the Court of 
Justice should have the exclusive right to rule on questions of Community 
law.4  
 
Although the Court would later hold that Article 41 ECSC permitted 
national courts to seek preliminary rulings on questions of interpretation,5 
the text of the provision envisaged preliminary rulings only on questions of 
validity. It was not until the negotiations on what was to become the EEC 
Treaty that the idea of expressly allowing the Court to give preliminary 
rulings on questions of interpretation was put forward. The author of that 
proposal was Nicola Catalano, the Italian member of the groupe de rédaction, 
former legal adviser of the High Authority and later a Judge at the Court 
from 1958-61. Based on Italian law, Catalano’s proposal had originally 
suggested that national court’s should have the right to seek preliminary 
rulings on the application of Community law and that it should state 
expressly that the rulings of the Court would be binding on national courts.6 
Those particular suggestions did not survive the drafting process, although 
there is a fine line between interpreting and applying the law7 and the 
binding nature of preliminary rulings would later be confirmed by the 
                                                          
4 A Boerger-De Smedt, ‘La Cour de Justice dans les Négotiations du Traité de Paris 
Instituant la CECA’ (2008) 14 Journal of European Integration History 7, 28-29. 
5 Case C-221/88 Busseni EU:C:1990:84. 
6 A Boerger-De Smedt, ‘Negotiating the Foundations of European Law, 1950-57: The Legal 
History of the Treaties of Paris and Rome’ (2012) 21 Contemporary European History 339, 
352. 
7 M Rasmussen, ‘Constructing and Deconstructing ‘Constitutional’ European Law: Some 
Reflections on How to Study the History of European Law’ in H Koch et al (eds), Europe: The 
New Legal Realism (DJØF, 2010) 639, 642. 
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Court.8 More significantly, the result, as Morten Rasmussen has observed, 
was a system that ‘would depend completely on the cooperation of national 
Courts in order to function.’9 It is unlikely that the future significance of the 
system was fully appreciated.10 
 
Much ink has been spilt by both lawyers and political scientists in 
attempting to explain why so many national courts played their part so 
conscientiously in making the preliminary rulings procedure a success. One 
of the most significant insights has been the theory of judicial empowerment 
advanced by Joseph Weiler and later developed by Karen Alter in her 
writings on what she calls inter-court competition. 
 
Weiler suggested that, when a national court made a reference for a 
preliminary ruling, a form of judicial empowerment was in operation. This 
enabled lower national courts in particular to exercise powers they had not 
previously enjoyed, bypassing their hierarchical superiors in the process:11  
 
Lower courts and their judges were given the facility to engage with 
the highest jurisdiction in the Community and, even more remarkable, 
to gain the power of judicial review over the executive and legislative 
branches even in those jurisdictions where such judicial power was 
weak or non-existent. Has not power been the most intoxicating 
potion in human affairs? 
 
Alter developed Weiler’s thesis, claiming:12 
 
                                                          
8 E.g. Case 29/68 Milchkontor v Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken EU:C:1969:27 ; Case C-173/09 
Elchinov  EU:C:2010:581. See below. 
9 Above, n 7, 643. 
10 Boerger-De Smedt, above, n 4, 30; Rasmussen, above n 7, 643. 
11 J Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (CUP, 1999) 197. 
12 ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’ in A-M Slaughter, A Stone Sweet and J Weiler, 
(eds), The European Courts and National Courts—Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, 1997) 
227, 241. 
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that different courts have different interests vis-à-vis EC law, and that 
national courts use EC law in bureaucratic struggles between levels of 
the judiciary and between the judiciary and political bodies, thereby 
inadvertently facilitating the process of legal integration. 
 
According to Alter, it was the difference between the interests of lower and 
higher courts that was crucial. She argued that the preliminary rulings 
procedure enabled the former to circumvent the case law of the latter by 
enlisting the help of the Court of Justice. The procedure might as a corollary 
threaten the authority and independence of the higher national courts.13 
 
The famous English case of Bulmer v Bollinger,14 decided shortly after UK 
accession, showed awareness by a higher national court (the English Court 
of Appeal) of the threat posed to its authority by the preliminary rulings 
procedure. In that case, Lord Denning MR laid down an elaborate set of 
guidelines for the benefit of English judges called upon to decide points of 
Community law before giving judgment. The guidelines seemed calculated to 
encourage English judges to resolve questions of Community law for 
themselves and only to request preliminary rulings in exceptional 
circumstances. It seems likely that Lord Denning saw in the Court of Justice 
a rival which might limit the power of the higher English courts to control 
lower courts and influence the future direction of the law. 
 
The Križan case 
 
In the years that have passed since Bulmer v Bollinger, a substantial body of 
case law has developed supporting the theory of inter-court competition at 
the national level. The potential for such competition to be deliberately 
exploited by the Court of Justice was highlighted in Jozef Križan and Others 
v Slovenská inšpekcia životného prostredia,15 a case which perfectly 
                                                          
13 K Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law (OUP, 2001) 47–52. 
14 [1974] Ch 401. 
15 Case C-416/10 EU:C:2013:8. 
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illustrates the capacity of the preliminary rulings procedure to subvert 
national judicial hierarchies. 
 
Underlying the Križan case was a complicated dispute over the proposed 
construction of a landfill site in the Slovak town of Pezinok. The intervener in 
the main proceedings was granted a permit by the competent Slovak authority 
to build and operate the site. The appellants in the main action brought an 
administrative appeal against the authority’s decision to grant the permit on 
the basis that the application had not initially contained the urban planning 
decision required by national law and that, when that decision was submitted, 
it was not published. 
 
When the administrative appeal was unsuccessful, the appellants brought 
proceedings in the Regional Court of Bratislava, an administrative court of 
first instance. Those proceedings were also unsuccessful, so the appellants 
lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic. The 
Supreme Court overturned the outcome of the administrative appeal and 
quashed the decision to issue the permit on the basis that the competent 
authorities had breached the rules on public participation in the procedure 
and had not properly appraised the environmental impact of the proposed 
venture. 
 
The respondents thereupon appealed to the Constitutional Court of the Slovak 
Republic, which held that the Supreme Court had infringed the respondents’ 
fundamental rights under the Slovak Constitution and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It also found that the Supreme Court had 
exceeded its powers by examining the lawfulness of the procedure and of the 
environmental impact assessment decision, which had not in any event been 
contested by the appellants. The Constitutional Court therefore set the 
contested judgment aside and sent the case back to the Supreme Court so 
that it could give a fresh ruling. 
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Under Slovak law, the Supreme Court was bound by the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court. However, the Supreme Court still entertained doubts 
about whether the contested decisions were consistent with EU law. It 
therefore referred a number of questions to the Court of Justice of its own 
motion. It is the first question that is relevant to the present discussion. It had 
two parts. 
 
The first part asked whether a national court was entitled of its own motion to 
make a reference to the Court of Justice ‘following a referral back after the 
constitutional court of the Member State concerned has annulled its first 
decision and although a national rule obliges it to resolve the dispute by 
following the legal opinion of that latter court.’16 
 
The second part of the question asked ‘whether Article 267 TFEU must be 
interpreted as obliging that same national court to refer a case to the Court of 
Justice although its decisions may form the subject, before a constitutional 
court, of an action limited to examining whether there has been an 
infringement of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the national 
Constitution or by an international agreement.’17 
 
On the first part, Advocate General Kokott pointed out that the case law of the 
Court showed that ‘neither the requirements of the Constitutional Court nor 
the fact that the parties have not asked for questions to be referred to the 
Court of Justice preclude a reference for a preliminary ruling.’18 Article 267 
TFEU, she said, conferred on national courts ‘the widest discretion – which 
may be exercised ex officio or at the request of the parties – to make a 
reference to the Court of Justice if they consider that a case pending before 
them raises issues involving an interpretation or assessment of the validity of 
provisions of European Union law and requiring a decision by them.’19 
 
                                                          
16 Judgment, para 62. 
17 Judgment, para 62. 
18 Opinion, para 55. 
19 Opinion, para 56 (footnotes omitted). 
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The Court agreed, declaring:20 
 
A rule of national law, pursuant to which legal rulings of a higher court 
bind another national court, cannot take away from the latter court the 
discretion to refer to the Court of Justice questions of interpretation of 
the points of European Union law concerned by such legal rulings. That 
court must be free, if it considers that a higher court’s legal ruling 
could lead it to deliver a judgment contrary to European Union law, to 
refer to the Court of Justice questions which concern it… 
 
Having made a reference, the referring court would be bound by the 
interpretation given by the Court of the provisions in question. If in the light of 
that interpretation the referring court concluded that the ruling of the higher 
court was not consistent with Union law, it would be obliged to disregard it. 
Those principles applied not just to relations between ordinary national 
courts but also to relations between a constitutional court and other 
national courts. The Court emphasised that ‘rules of national law, even of a 
constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the unity and 
effectiveness of European Union law…’21 
 
The second part of the Supreme Court’s first question was essentially designed 
to establish whether it constituted a court of last resort for the purposes of 
Article 267 and was therefore subject to the obligation to refer laid down in the 
third paragraph of that article. 
 
A court of last resort for these purposes is, as Article 267 puts it, a court 
‘against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law…’ 
Advocate General Kokott said that a judicial remedy in this context ‘must 
allow the raising, as its subject-matter, of a question concerning the correct 
application of European Union law…’22 Although the decisions of the Supreme 
Court were subject to review by the Constitutional Court, that court was 
                                                          
20 Judgment, para 68. 
21 Judgment, para 70. 
22 Opinion, para 57. 
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‘limited to ensuring compliance with the Slovak Constitution’ and did not 
have the power ‘to verify compliance by national authorities and courts with 
European Union law.’23 She therefore proceeded on the basis that the 
Supreme Court was covered by the obligation to refer imposed by the third 
paragraph of Article 267, at least for the purposes of the present dispute. 
 
Again the Court agreed with the Advocate General. The Supreme Court was, 
it said, 24  
 
required to submit a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of 
Justice when it finds that the substance of the dispute concerns a 
question to be resolved which comes within the scope of the first 
paragraph of Article 267 TFEU. The possibility of bringing, before the 
constitutional court of the Member State concerned, an action against 
the decisions of a national court, limited to an examination of a 
potential infringement of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
national constitution or by an international agreement, cannot allow 
the view to be taken that that national court cannot be classified as a 
court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under 
national law within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 
267 TFEU. 
 
The Court therefore answered the first question in the following terms: 
‘Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a national court, 
such as the referring court, is obliged to make, of its own motion, a request 
for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice even though it is ruling on a 
referral back to it after its first decision was set aside by the constitutional 
court of the Member State concerned and even though a national rule 
obliges it to resolve the dispute by following the legal opinion of that latter 
court.’25 
 
                                                          
23 Opinion, para 58. 
24 Judgment, para 72. 
25 Judgment, para 73; operative part, para 1. 
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Observations on the Court’s ruling in Križan 
 
The answer given by the Court to the first part of the first question referred to 
it by the Slovakian Supreme Court was based on established case law laying 
down a principle that should be uncontroversial. 
 
The Court has made it clear that, ‘in order to ensure the primacy of EU law’, 
the functioning of the system of cooperation between the Court of Justice and 
the national courts established by Article 267 means that a national court 
must ‘be free to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling any 
question that it considers necessary, at whatever stage of the proceedings it 
considers appropriate…’ 26 The preliminary rulings procedure is ‘completely 
independent of any initiative by the parties’.27 Thus, the wide discretion 
enjoyed by national courts whenever they consider that a question of Union 
law needs to be answered to enable them to give judgment may be exercised 
either at the request of the parties to the main action or of the national court’s 
own motion.28 It is also well established that a preliminary ruling binds the 
referring court as to the interpretation or validity of the provision in 
question.29 
 
It is therefore evident that a national rule to the effect that courts are bound 
by the rulings of a higher court cannot deprive lower courts of the right to 
make a reference to the Court of Justice where they wish to check that such 
rulings are compatible with Union law. If the contrary were the case, the 
primacy of Union law would be compromised. This was underlined by the 
Court in Elchinov,30 where it recalled, citing Simmenthal,31 that ‘a national 
court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply 
provisions of European Union law is under a duty to give full effect to those 
                                                          
26 Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 Melki and Abdeli EU:C:2010:363, para 52 of the 
judgment. 
27 Case C-210/06 Cartesio EU:C:2008:723, para 90. 
28 Cartesio, para 88; Case C-104/10 Kelly EU:C:2011:506, para 61. 
29 Above, n 8. 
30 Case C-173/09, para 31 of the judgment. See also Case C-396/09 Interedil  
EU:C:2011:671, para 38 of the judgment. 
31 Case 106/77 EU:C:1978:49. 
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provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting 
provision of national legislation’, such as a rule requiring it to follow the 
decisions of a higher court. It is not necessary for the court in question ‘to 
request or await the prior setting aside of that national provision by legislative 
or other constitutional means…’  
 
The logic underlying the principles referred to above is ineluctable and they 
were all well established at the time of the reference in Križan. It was not 
therefore necessary for the first part of the first question referred in that case 
to be put to the Court of Justice. This point will be pursued below. 
 
The response of the Court of Justice to the second part of the first question 
was more interesting. Križan was not the first case to raise the question 
whether a national court whose decisions were only in limited circumstances 
subject to appeal to a higher court constituted a court ‘against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy’ within the meaning of the third 
paragraph of Article 267. The language of the Treaty might suggest that any 
judicial remedy, however limited, is enough to remove the obligation to refer. 
Moreover, the burden on the Court of Justice would be very heavy if too many 
national courts were required to refer. However, the effectiveness of the 
procedure in ensuring the uniform application of Union law would be 
enhanced if the number of national courts with the discretion not to refer were 
kept to a minimum.32 So a balance needs to be struck. 
 
The English case of Chiron Corporation v Murex Diagnostics33 raised the issue 
in connection with the arrangements for appealing from the Court of Appeal to 
the House of Lords (now the UK Supreme Court). Such an appeal may only be 
brought with the permission of either the Court of Appeal or the higher court. 
If the Court of Appeal refuses permission, does that turn it into a court of last 
resort for the purposes of Article 267? In Chiron, the Court of Appeal held that 
the possibility of making an application to the House of Lords for permission 
                                                          
32 A Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (OUP, 2nd ed, 2006) 120. 
33.  [1995] All ER (EC) 88, [1995] FSR 309. See D Anderson and M Demetriou, References to the 
European Court (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed, 2002) 167-169. 
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to appeal constituted a ‘judicial remedy’ within the meaning of Article 267. The 
Court of Appeal could not therefore be considered a court of last resort itself 
for the purposes of that provision. 
 
No reference to the Court of Justice was made in Chiron, but the position 
taken by the English Court of Appeal was endorsed in Lyckeskog.34 In that 
case, a reference was made by the Court of Appeal for Western Sweden, which 
wanted to know if it was a court of last resort under Article 267. The referring 
court’s decision in the main action would be subject to appeal to the Swedish 
Supreme Court, but only if the Supreme Court declared it admissible on 
grounds set out in the Swedish Code of Procedure. The Court of Justice ruled 
that the possibility of an appeal to the Supreme Court meant that the Court of 
Appeal could not be considered a court of last resort, even where the merits of 
the appeal would only be examined by the Supreme Court if it declared the 
appeal admissible. 
 
Lyckeskog  was followed in Cartesio,35 which concerned a dispute over 
whether an amendment should be made to the entry in the Hungarian 
commercial register concerning Cartesio’s company seat. The dispute reached 
the Regional Court of Appeal, Szeged, where two questions concerning the 
status of that court under Article 267 arose. 
 
The first was whether the referring court, when hearing an appeal against a 
decision of a lower court responsible for maintaining the commercial register, 
constituted a court of tribunal of a Member State, given that the proceedings 
before both the referring court and the lower court were not inter partes. In 
considering whether a body constitutes  a ‘court or tribunal of a Member 
State’ for the purposes of Article 267, the Court of Justice normally mentions 
as one of the factors to be taken into account whether the procedure followed 
by the body concerned is inter partes,36 although it has made it clear that this 
                                                          
34 Case  C-99/00 EU:C:2002:329. 
35 Case C-210/06 EU:C:2008:723. 
36 See e.g. Case 61/65 Vaassen v Beambtenfonds Mijnbedrijf  EU:C:1966:39; Case C-53/03 
Syfait and Others EU:C:2005:333; Case C-96/04 Standesamt Stadt Niebüll EU:C:2006:254 . 
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is not an absolute criterion.37 Moreover, the Court has rejected as 
inadmissible references made by courts responsible for registers relating to, 
for example, land38 or companies,39 where their decisions are administrative 
rather than judicial in character.  However, the Court held in Cartesio that the 
referring court, which was acting in an appellate capacity, was ‘called upon to 
give judgment in a dispute and is exercising a judicial function.’40 It therefore 
constituted a court or tribunal even though the proceedings before it were not 
inter partes. 
 
Those obstacles having been overcome, the second question fell to be 
considered. This asked whether the referring court was a court of last resort 
for the purposes of the third paragraph of Article 267. That issue arose 
because, as the Court explained,41 
 
…although Hungarian law provides that decisions delivered on appeal 
by the referring court may be the subject of an extraordinary appeal – in 
other words, an appeal on a point of law before the Legfelsőbb Bíróság 
[Supreme Court], the purpose of which is to ensure the consistency of 
the case-law – the possibilities of bringing such an appeal are limited, in 
particular, by the condition governing the admissibility of pleas, which 
is linked to the obligation to allege a breach of law, and in view of the 
fact…that under Hungarian law an appeal on a point of law does not, in 
principle, have the effect of suspending enforcement of the decision 
delivered on appeal. 
 
Citing Lyckeskog, the Court held that the restrictions applicable to appeals to 
the Supreme Court ‘do not have the effect of depriving the parties in a case 
before a court whose decisions are amenable to an appeal on a point of law of 
the possibility of exercising effectively their right to appeal the decision handed 
                                                          
37 Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult EU:C:1997:413, para 31 of the judgment; Case C-17/00 De 
Coster EU:C:2001:651, para 14 of the judgment. 
38 Case C-178/99 Salzmann EU:C:2001:331. 
39 Case C-111/94 Job Centre EU:C:1995:340; Case C-86/00 HSB-Wohnbau EU:C:2001:394. 
40 Judgment, para 58. 
41 Judgment, para 75. 
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down by that court in a dispute such as that in the main proceedings.’42 It 
followed that the referring court was not subject to the obligation to refer laid 
down in the third paragraph of Article 267. 
 
To summarise, the Court of Appeal in Lyckeskog  was found not to be a court 
of last resort because of the possibility of an appeal to the Supreme Court, 
even though the merits of the appeal would only be examined by the Supreme 
Court where it had declared the appeal admissible. True, the Court did 
emphasise that, if a question of Union law arose for decision, ‘the supreme 
court will be under an obligation…to refer a question to the Court of Justice 
for a preliminary ruling either at the stage of the examination of 
admissibility or at a later stage.’ 43 However, if the Supreme Court happened 
to examine the question of Union law at the admissibility stage and 
concluded that no reference was necessary, there could be no guarantee 
that it would revisit the issue later even if its significance emerged more 
clearly when the substance of the case was being considered. In Cartesio, the 
referring court was found not to be a court of last resort even though the right 
to bring an appeal to the Constitutional Court was limited to points of law and 
did not have suspensory effect. However, in Križan, the Supreme Court was 
found to be a court of last resort because the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court was limited to alleged infringements of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the national constitution or by an international 
agreement. Neither the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott nor the 
judgment of the Court contained any detailed analysis of the scope of the 
right to appeal to the Constitutional Court. 
 
The first principle applied by the Court of Justice in Križan – that a rule of 
national law making the rulings of a higher court binding on an inferior 
national court cannot deprive that court of its right to invoke the 
preliminary rulings procedure – undoubtedly has the potential to undermine 
national judicial hierarchies and fuel inter-court competition. This is an 
                                                          
42 Judgment, para 78. 
43 Judgment, para 18. 
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unintended and unavoidable consequence of the preliminary rulings 
procedure and its underlying logic. That logic was exploited by the Slovak 
Supreme Court when it made an unnecessary reference on a question the 
answer to which was clear. It doubtless took the view that it would be useful 
from the perspective of Slovak judicial politics to have specific confirmation 
from the Court of Justice of its right to refer. 
 
The second of the Court’s findings – that the referring court constituted a 
court of last resort within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 267 
– reinforced the position of the Supreme Court by shielding it from criticism 
that it had acted unlawfully by enlisting the assistance of the Court of 
Justice. However, the conclusion reached by the Court of Justice on the 
status of the Supreme Court under Article 267 is not easy to reconcile with 
its previous case law, where limited rights of appeal were found to constitute 
a judicial remedy under Article 267 even though they might have prevented 
the issues of EU law in play from receiving a proper airing. 
 
The suspicion that the Court of Justice was intervening directly in a 
domestic dispute between two national courts could and should have been 
allayed by a more detailed examination of the Slovakian Constitutional 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. An important question would seem to have 
been whether it might have had jurisdiction to consider alleged 
infringements of a party’s rights under EU law on the ground that they were 
based on an ‘international agreement’. The Court’s judgment did not 
address the question whether the appellants’ rights under Union law were 
less firmly protected under the Slovak system than under the Swedish or 
Hungarian systems. Yet this needed to be established in order to justify the 
apparent departure from the approach taken in Lyckeskog and Cartesio. 
Indeed, those decisions might have been interpreted as attempts to control 
the volume of references by minimising the class of national courts covered 
by the obligation to refer. That imperative was not of course expressly 
articulated, but Križan might be said to underline the dangers for the Court 
of allowing itself to be influenced by unarticulated managerial 
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considerations such as this which seem in a later case to be less pressing 
than other competing factors. 
 
The contrast with Melki and Abdeli 
 
The Court’s approach in Križan contrasts with its approach in Melki and 
Abdeli,44 another case that may usefully be examined through the prism of 
inter-court competition. A reference to the Court of Justice by the French 
Cour de Cassation, the case involved two Algerian nationals unlawfully 
present in France. They were stopped by the police under the French Code 
of Criminal Procedure near the French border with Belgium, detained and 
served with deportation orders. Before the competent judge at first instance, 
the individuals concerned raised a priority question on constitutionality, 
that is, a plea alleging that their rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
French Constitution had been prejudiced. The claimants argued that the 
provisions of the French Code of Criminal Procedure authorising border 
controls at or near the borders of France with other Member States were 
contrary to the Treaty rules on the free movement of persons and that those 
rules enjoyed constitutional status under the French Constitution. 
 
Article 61-1 of the Constitution provided (so far as relevant) that, where it 
was claimed in proceedings before a court or tribunal that the rights and 
freedoms it guaranteed were prejudiced by a legislative provision, the matter 
could be brought before the Conseil Constitutionnel by way of a reference 
from the Cour de Cassation. The judge at first instance decided to invoke 
that provision and submitted to the Cour de Cassation the question whether 
the disputed provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were compatible 
with the Constitution. The legislation applicable required the Cour de 
Cassation to ‘rule as a matter of priority on the referral of the question on 
constitutionality to the Conseil constitutionnel’45 and to deliver its decision 
within three months. 
                                                          
44 Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 EU:C:2010:363. 
45 English translation taken from para 14 of the judgment of the Court of Justice. 
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The Cour de Cassation pointed out that the case raised the question 
whether the Code of Criminal Procedure was consistent with both EU law 
and the Constitution. However, it considered that the effect of the relevant 
national provisions was to deprive it of the opportunity to make a reference 
to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling where a priority question of 
constitutionality had been referred to the Conseil Constitutionnel. Since it 
took the view that its decision on whether to refer the case to the Conseil 
Constitutionnel depended on the interpretation of EU law, it referred two 
questions to the Court of Justice before taking that decision. The first 
question asked whether Article 267 precluded national provisions requiring 
courts to rule as matter of priority on the submission to a higher court of 
the question of the constitutionality of a domestic provision where the doubt 
as to its constitutionality arose because it was alleged to be contrary to EU 
law. The second question sought guidance on the compatibility with EU law 
of provisions such as those of the French Code of Criminal Procedure in 
dispute. 
 
The ruling of the Court of Justice was given under the accelerated procedure 
laid down by the Statute46 and Rules of Procedure.47 The Court began by 
declaring:48 
 
…Article 267 TFEU precludes Member State legislation which 
establishes an interlocutory procedure for the review of the 
constitutionality of national laws, in so far as the priority nature of 
that procedure prevents – both before the submission of a question on 
constitutionality to the national court responsible for reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws and, as the case may be, after the decision of 
that court on that question – all the other national courts or tribunals 
from exercising their right or fulfilling their obligation to refer 
questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. 
                                                          
46 See now Art 23a. 
47 See now Art 105. 
48 Judgment, para 57. 
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However, it went on to add: 
 
…Article 267 TFEU does not preclude such national legislation, in so 
far as the other national courts or tribunals remain free: 
 
–        to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, at 
whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate, even at 
the end of the interlocutory procedure for the review of 
constitutionality, any question which they consider necessary, 
 
–        to adopt any measure necessary to ensure provisional judicial 
protection of the rights conferred under the European Union legal 
order, and 
 
–        to disapply, at the end of such an interlocutory procedure, the 
national legislative provision at issue if they consider it to be contrary 
to EU law. 
 
It is for the referring court to ascertain whether the national 
legislation at issue in the main proceedings can be interpreted in 
accordance with those requirements of EU law. 
 
It is not difficult to see Melki and Abdeli as a struggle between two courts. 
The origins of the Cour de Cassation can be traced back to the French 
revolution and beyond.49 By contrast, the Conseil Constitutionnel is a 
relative newcomer created in 1958 by the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic50 (though the provisions on priority questions on constitutionality 
at issue in Melki and Abdeli were introduced only in 2009). The Conseil 
Constitutionnel states revealingly on its web site that it is not a supreme 
                                                          
49https://www.courdecassation.fr/cour_cassation_1/presentation_2845/r_cour_cassation_
30989.html (accessed 7 September 2016). 
50 See J Bell, French Constitutional Law (OUP, 1992). 
Page 18 of 20 
 
court above the Conseil d’Etat and the Cour de Cassation.51 Is this perhaps 
a tacit acknowledgment of latent judicial rivalry between a court anxious to 
cement its place in the national constitutional and judicial firmament and 
two established courts anxious to preserve theirs? Or is it rather that a 
powerful and self-confident newcomer is trying to avoid ruffling the feathers 
of two proud incumbents? 
 
The measured nature of the judgment of the Court of Justice52 showed that 
it was fully aware of these simmering tensions and did not wish to inflame 
them. Indeed, inter-court competition is not confined to the national arena 
and the Court of Justice may have wished gently to remind judicial 
interlocutors from one of the most important founding Member States of its 
own prerogatives. The subtlety of the Court’s approach bore fruit in 2013, 
when the Conseil Constitutionnel itself made a reference for a preliminary 
ruling in proceedings on a priority question of constitutionality.53 The Court 
may have felt it could deal more bluntly with the Constitutional Court of a 
small newcomer which had only recently emerged from the shadow of the 
Soviet Union. The wisdom of that more robust stance is considered in the final 
section of this contribution. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The secrecy of the Court’s deliberations means that we shall probably never 
know what lay behind the judgment in Križan.54 Perhaps it was only a 
happy coincidence that the outcome was to shore up the position of a 
                                                          
51 ‘Le Conseil constitutionnel n'est pas une cour suprême au-dessus du Conseil d'État et de 
la Cour de cassation’: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/francais/le-conseil-constitutionnel/presentation-generale/presentation-
generale.206.html (accessed 7 September 2016). 
52 The Court’s ruling on the substance of the case was also a qualified one: see para 75 of 
the judgment. 
53 Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F v Premier ministre EU:C:2013:358. The Court gave its 
ruling in under two months. 
54 The secrecy of the Court’s deliberations has on the whole been strictly observed, though 
the way each judge voted in Case 26/62Van Gend en Loos EU:C:1963:1now seems to have 
been established. See M Rasmussen, ‘From Costa v ENEL to the Treaties of Rome: A Brief 
History of a Legal Revolution’ in MP Maduro and L Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU 
Law (Hart, 2010) 69, 76-77; Rasmussen, above, n 7, 648-649. 
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national court that seemed more europarechtsfreundlich than its 
hierarchical superior. If so, that would be reassuring. The Court of Justice 
needs the cooperation of national supreme courts and, when dealing with 
them, should heed the advice of the late Sir Neil MacCormick to be 
circumspect  and exercise ‘political as much as legal judgment.’55 Playing 
judicial politics on an ad hoc basis may be tempting in isolated cases but 
will ultimately serve only to muddle the case law and stoke resistance to the 
requirements of EU law in the upper reaches of some national judiciaries. 
 
Although the Bundesverfassungsgericht56 did not ultimately resist the 
judgment of the Court of Justice in Gauweiler,57 the stance for which it has 
become famous has influenced supreme courts all over the Union. This was 
dramatically illustrated in the so-called ‘Slovak pensions’ case,58 where the 
Czech Constitutional Court declared a decision of the Court of Justice59 
ultra vires on the basis that it exceeded the powers transferred to the Union 
under the Czech Constitution. As a result, it declined to follow that decision, 
applying instead a constitutional principle and fundamental right of 
domestic origin. 
 
Some national supreme courts in the Union are operating in contexts where 
the rule of law is not yet as firmly embedded as it is elsewhere. An example 
is Poland, where politically-motivated attempts to change the powers and 
membership of its Constitutional Court attracted criticism from the Venice 
Commission60 and the intervention of the European Commission under its 
rule of law framework.61 In its dealings with courts such as these, the Court 
of Justice should tread carefully, for heavy-handed interference may 
                                                          
55 N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (OUP, 1999) 119. 
56 See its judgment of 21 June 2016. 
57 Case C-62/14 EU:C:2015:400. 
58 Pl. ÚS 5/12, 31 January 2012. See R Zbíral, “A Legal Revolution or Negligible Episode? 
Court of Justice Decision Proclaimed Ultra Vires,” (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 
1475. 
59 Case C-399/09 Landtová EU:C:2011:415. 
60 The Venice Commission is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional affairs. 
See its report of 11 March 2016 (Opinion no 833/2015). 
61 COM(2014) 158 final (19 March 2014). 
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ultimately undermine the integrity of the preliminary rulings procedure and 
weaken the rule of law. 
 
